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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Crookstons1 failure to controvert the errors
committed by the trial court in dismissing Rocky Mountain State
Bank should be viewed as a confession of reversible error. The
"last minute" dismissal of the bank was both procedurally and
substantively defective.

The dismissal, and the trial court's

refusal to grant a continuance, severely prejudiced Fire
Insurance's rights.
Fire Insurance properly raised its constitutional
challenges at the trial court.

The determination of whether such

constitutional claims have been raised should be guided by liberal
principles tending to promote just and fair results.
This Court should review patently defective jury
instructions, even though formal objections to those instructions
were not made at trial.

Significant considerations of justice and

public policy warrant careful review of the defective instructions.
The trial court further committed error in denying Fire
Insurance's motion for summary judgment on the Crookstons1
complaint.

The parties' one-year contractual limitation was

enforceable as a matter of law.

The limitation barred all of the

Crookstons' causes of action.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I,
THE CROOKSTONS CONFESS BOTH SUBSTANTIVE AND
PROCEDURAL ERRORS IN CONNECTION WITH THE
TRIAL COURT'S DISMISSAL OF ROCKY MOUNTAIN
STATE BANK.
The Crookstons' brief fails to controvert Fire Insurance's
claims that the trial court committed reversible error in granting
Rocky Mountain State Bank's "last minute" motion for summary judgment on the morning of trial.

The Crookstons merely contend that

Fire Insurance Exchange did not have an "absolute right" to have
the bank present during the trial, and that there was no error in
refusing to continue the trial following the granting of the motion
for summary judgment.

The Crookstons' silence on this point

should be viewed as a confession of error.

See, Wickman v. Arizona

State Board of Osteopathic Examiners, 138 Ariz.App. 337, 674 P.2d
891, 894 (1983) ("If a debatable issue is raised on appeal,
appellee's silence constitutes a confession of reversible error.")
As Fire Insurance Exchange's initial brief demonstrated,
the trial court committed reversible error in failing to allow
Fire Insurance adequate time to respond to the bank's motion for
summary judgment.

The bank served its motion for summary judgment

and memorandum in support thereof on the evening of Friday, May 22,
1987, the day prior to the start of a three-day Memorial Day
weekend.

On May 26, 1987, just five calendar days and one working

day later, the trial court granted the bank's motion for summary
judgment.
action.

The ruling came only minutes before trial began in this

The trial court's actions violated both Rule 56(c) of the
-2-

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 4(d) of the Rules of Practice
of the Third Judicial District Court.

The motion and the hearing

thereon were objected to by counsel for Fire Insurance.
2996-99)

(R. at

The procedural irregularities were also acknowledged by

counsel for both the Crookstons and the bank.

(R. at 2997, 3000-01)

The trial court's total disregard of controlling rules of
procedure and practice resulted in the court being less than fully
informed on the pertinent substantive law of contribution.

The

trial court was told little more than that as a general rule contribution is not permitted between intentional tortfeasors.
(R. at 2994-3013)

However, as demonstrated in Fire Insurance's

initial brief, at the time of the alleged tortious acts in this
case, there was contribution among intentional joint tortfeasors
in the State of Utah.

See Appellant's Brief at 100-15

The trial

court's finding that Fire Insurance had no right of contribution
against Rocky Mountain State Bank was, therefore, error. The
Crookstons do not dispute that fact in their brief. The
Crookstons' silence in this regard constitutes a confession of
reversible error.
The Crookstons contend on appeal that the trial court's
dismissal of Fire Insurance's claim of contribution against the
bank does not constitute prejudicial error since Fire Insurance
had no "absolute right to have all potential joint tort-feasors
joined in an action."

Respondents' Brief at 84. The Crookstons

then cite this Court to Cruz v. Montoya, 660 P.2d 723 (Utah 1983)
in support of their contention.

Although this Court in Cruz

-3-

clearly suggests that a right of contribution exists among
intentional joint tortfeasors, Cruz does not stand for the
proposition for which it is cited by the Crookstons.

Indeed,

Cruz is distinguishable from the instant case in one essential
aspect:

the defendant in Cruz did not have the other potential

joint tortfeasors joined in the action.

In the instant case,

Rocky Mountain State Bank was a party until the ill-timed hearing
moments before the trial began.

While there may not be an abso-

lute right to require the presence and participation of other
potential joint tortfeasors, who for one reason or another are not
present in the litigation, once potential joint tortfeasors are
joined, a defendant has a vested right to keep them in the action.
Since Rocky Mountain State Bank was already a party,
Fire Insurance had a vested right to require and demand that Rocky
Mountain State Bank remain present as a party during the course
of the subsequent trial.
The Crookstons also contend on appeal that the claims of
error for the dismissal of the bank on the morning of trial do
"not negate the jury's finding that Fire Insurance wrongfully
injured the Crookstons."

Respondents' brief at 84. Fire

Insurance does not contest the fact that the jury returned a
verdict finding that it had injured the Crookstons.

What Fire

Insurance does contest is the fact that the trial court, in
improperly dismissing Rocky Mountain State Bank minutes before
trial, did not permit the same jury to pass judgment on both Fire
Insurance's actions and the actions of Rocky Mountain State Bank.

-4-

Fundamental justice requires that where two joint tortfeasors are
present before the same court that the relative fault and
culpability of each of those joint tortfeasors be determined by
the same trier of fact. The trial court's dismissal of Rocky
Mountain State Bank, in essence, denied Fire Insurance its vested
right to have the relative fault of two alleged joint tortfeasors
determined by the same trier of fact.
The Crookstons likewise contend on appeal that the trial
court did not commit error in refusing to grant a continuance.
Respondents' Brief at 85. The Crookstons rhetorically ask:
"What more would the bank's presence add in Fire Insurance's
favor?"

lei. The Crookstons then boldly pronounce that there is

no evidence that the trial court acted unreasonably or
capriciously.

As stated previously, the trial court's actions on

the morning of trial were fundamentally flawed, both procedurally
and substantively.

Fire Insurance went to the courthouse on the

morning of trial expecting that the Crookstons' claims would be
refuted by not one, but two parties. Fire Insurance went to the
courthouse on the morning of trial with every right to expect that
the comparative fault of each of the alleged joint tortfeasors
would be determined by the same jury.

Once the trial court's

wholly unexpected and improper actions occurred, Fire Insurance
promptly moved to continue the trial for a later date.
3007)

(R. at

Such a continuance was proper in order for Fire Insurance

to reexamine its potential claims and theories against the bank,
as well as to modify its trial strategy due to the fact that Fire

-5-

Insurance was the sole remaining defendant.

The rules of proce-

dure and practice were implemented to prevent trial by ambush.
Yet, in this case, Fire Insurance was ambushed by a "last minute"
settlement between the Crookstons and Rocky Mountain State Bank,
and an ill-timed and improperly-granted motion for summary judgment in favor of the bank on Fire Insurance's cross-claim.

To

say that Fire Insurance was not prejudiced, and that the trial
court did not act outside reason is to deny the obvious.
The Crookstons also urge on appeal that this case should
not be reversed and remanded due to the potential prejudice they
may sustain as a result of the stay of all proceedings involving
Rocky Mountain State Bank.

Respondent's Brief at 86-87.

The

Crookstons urge this Court to accept the proposition that it is
acceptable for Fire Insurance to be subject to that stay, but that
it is unacceptable for the Crookstons also to be subject to the
stay.

The essence of the Crookstons1 argument is that prejudice,

like beauty, is in the eye of the beholder.
Reversal and remand is further warranted due to the
impact the dismissal of the bank had on the trial. Where a ruling
is substantively incorrect, procedurally incorrect, and affects
the presentation of evidence at trial, the very essence of
reversible error is found.

The trial judge himself has admitted

that his ruling affected the trial from which this appeal is
brought:
Counsel, I recognize had the dismissal of the
Bank not occurred, that is, had this Court

-6-

ruled that there was indeed contribution . . .
between intentional tortfeasors, the complexion
of the trial and the issues submitted to the
jury may well have been different than they are.
In the Matter of the Possession of Rocky Mountain State Bank,
C87-5743, Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County,
Transcript of Motion to Lift Stay, April 8, 1988, at p. 20.
POINT II.
FIRE INSURANCE'S CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS ARE
PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT.
The Crookstons urge this Court to summarily dispose of
real and substantial constitutional issues raised by Fire
Insurance, in the court below and on appeal. Rather than directly
confront and refute the substantive arguments raised in Fire
Insurance's initial brief, the Crookstons urge this Court to
affirm on the ground that the constitutional claims were not
sufficiently raised at trial. However, a review of the case law
reveals that an issue may be raised at the trial level in several
ways.

In Rich v. McGovern, 551 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1976), this Court

held that a party's claims were sufficiently raised in the party's
pleadings, affidavits and depositions to be preserved on appeal.
In Rich, the plaintiffs brought suit in fraud seeking rescission
of their contract to purchase a water softener business. Defendants answered and counterclaimed for the purchase price of the
business.

Defendants filed affidavits in support of their answer,

which were countered by plaintiffs filing their depositions. Upon
the basis of the submissions, the trial court granted defendants'
motion for summary judgment.
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On appeal, plaintiffs contended that the defendants had
defrauded them into purchasing the business.

Defendants responded,

claiming that the plaintiffs raised certain matters which were not
presented to the trial court.

This Court, however, found that the

matters were raised at trial and remanded the case:
Upon examination we find that, though the
pleadings and submissions speak in generality,
the critical matters recited above pertaining
to the plaintiffs1 claims of fraud were sufficiently set forth in the pleadings, affidavits
and depositions.
Our conclusion is that it is necessary to
remand this case for trial.
Id. at 1268.
Likewise, in Mihalcik v. Celotex Corp., 354 Pa.Super.
163, 511 A.2d 239 (1986), the court held that certain issues had
been sufficiently raised at trial in order to be considered on
appeal.

In Mihalcik, plaintiffs brought nine separate actions for

asbestos-related injuries sustained by plaintiffs1 decedents.
Defendants filed motions for summary judgment, alleging that
plaintiffs1 claims were barred by the applicable statute of
limitation.

The defendants1 motions were granted.

Two of the

plaintiffs appealed, contending in part that the trial court had
erred in dismissing their breach of warranty survival claims.
Defendants argued on appeal that the appellate court should reject
the plaintiffs' arguments since that issue had not been raised at
trial.
In reversing in part and remanding the action back to the
trial court, the Pennsylvania court held that the issue had been

-8-

sufficiently raised at the trial level:
Appellees contend that this issue has been
raised for the first time on appeal and is
therefore waived. We disagree. Both
appellants raised this issue in their memoranda of law in opposition to appellees'
motions for summary judgment.
Id. at 249, n. 9.
Similarly, in Massey v. Aztec Life Ins. Co., 532 S.W.2d
702 (Tex.Civ.App. 1976), the court found that an issue raised in
deposition testimony could be reviewed on appeal.

In Massey,

plaintiff brought suit against her former employer's health
insurance provider for certain medical expenses.

The insurer had

denied benefits to the plaintiff on the ground that plaintiff's
coverage had lapsed and that plaintiff's disability was due to a
pre-existing condition.

The defendant insurer successfully moved

for summary judgment.
On appeal, plaintiff claimed that her deposition
testimony raised certain genuine issues of material fact.
Defendant objected on the grounds that plaintiff had failed to
raise the issue at trial. The Texas court reversed and remanded
the action, finding that the issue was sufficiently raised in the
deposition in order to be preserved on appeal.

1(3. at 706.

While it is generally true that an issue may not be
raised for the first time on appeal, the determination of whether
an issue has been raised in the court below should be guided by
liberal principles tending to serve the dictates of justice,
rather than procedural technicalities.

See, Zeman v. Lufthansa

German Airlines, 699 P.2d 1274, 1280 (Alaska 1985) (Appellate
-9-

courts should use a liberal approach towards determining whether
an issue or theory was raised in a lower court proceeding).
This Court in Pratt v. City of Riverton, 639 P.2d 172,
173-74 (Utah 1981), noted that issues not raised at trial generally
cannot be raised on appeal.

Pratt recognized an exception "where

a person's liberty is at stake."

id. at 174. While this Court in

Pratt did not define what liberty interest must be at stake in
order for the exception to apply, it is clear that Fire Insurance
has significant liberty interests at stake in this matter.

At a

minimum, Fire Insurance has a right to not have its property, 4,8
million dollars, taken by unconstitutional means.

Numerous courts

have interpreted liberty to include many of the interests of Fire
Insurance that are now jeopardized due to an unprecedented award
of punitive damages.

Liberty includes and comprehends all

personal rights and their enjoyment.

Rosenblum v. Rosenblum, 181

Misc. 78, 42 N.Y.S.2d 626, 630 (1943).
enjoyment and use of one's property.
Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936).

Liberty also includes the

Grosgean v. American Press

The term "liberty" must not be

restricted only to include freedom from arrest or restraint, but
should include the right to enjoy to the fullest extent the
privileges and protections given or assured by law, including
certain property interests.

See, McGrew v. Industrial Comm'n, 96

Utah 203, 85 P.2d 608, 611 (1938); State v. Nuss, 79 S.D. 522, 114
N.W.2d 633, 635 (1962).
Other courts have likewise held that a more liberal
approach should be taken in determining whether to consider

-10-

constitutional issues on appeal.

In Deseret Chrysler-Plymouth,

Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 600 P.2d 1189 (Nev. 1979), the Nevada
Supreme Court noted that its common practice of refusing to
consider issues for the first time on appeal was simply a
discretional "matter of practice,11 rather than a jurisdictional
limitation on the court's power.

The court then sua sponte raised

a constitutional issue as the basis for affirming the trial
court's actions.

Id. at 1191. See also, Gosewisch v. American

Honda Motor Co., 153 Ariz. 400, 737 P.2d 376 (1987) (Questions of
constitutional guarantees and violations thereof may be considered
for the first time on appeal); Pettit v. American National Bank,
649 P.2d 525 (Okla. 1982) (Constitutional due process claims may
be considered on appeal though not presented to the trial court).
The Crookstons admit that Fire Insurance raised its constitutional challenges prior to the post-trial motions and hearings
for new trial and judgment n.o.v.

Respondents' Brief at 59.

However, the Crookstons assert that the issues were not sufficiently raised, i.e., Fire Insurance did not obtain a specific
ruling as to the merits of their constitutional claim at trial.
Fire Insurance put its constitutional claims directly at issue in
its response to plaintiffs' trial memorandum on the issue of
punitive damages and motion in limine.

(R. at 1434-36.) In

addition to raising the significant constitutional issues in its
trial memorandum on punitive damages, Fire Insurance also raised
its constitutional claims in its answer to plaintiffs' second
amended complaint and its proposed jury instructions.
-11-

(R. at

1027-51, 1389.)
While Fire Insurance has had the opportunity to refine
its constitutional claims since the time of trial, parties to an
appeal are entitled to expand and refine the details of their
arguments preserved on appeal.

Zeman v. Lufthansa German

Airlines, 699 P.2d 1274, 1280 (Alaska 1985).

The issues and

arguments raised by Fire Insurance on appeal are nothing more
than a refinement of matters previously raised before the trial
court.

Review of the constitutional claims of Fire Insurance is

further warranted by the ever-increasing frequency and size of
punitive damage awards in the State of Utah.

See Addendum A-3.

The Crookstons also suggest that there is no merit to
Fire Insurance Exchange's constitutional claims due to the United
States Supreme Court's refusal to grant certiorari to several
cases involving similar constitutional challenges.

However, the

Crookstons' reliance on denials of certiorari is without
substance.

The United States Supreme Court repeatedly has

stressed that the denial of certiorari has no precedential effect.
Justice Frankfurter in State v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S.
912, 917-19 (1950), stated as follows:
The sole significance of such denial of a
petition for writ of certiorari need not be
elucidated to those versed in the Court's
procedures. It simply means that fewer than
four members of the Court deemed it desirable
to review a decision of the lower court as a
matter "of sound judicial discretion." Rule
38, Para. 5. A variety of considerations
underlie denials of the writ, and as to the
same petition different reasons may lead

-12-

different justices to the same result. This
is especially true of petitions for review on
writ of certiorari to a State court. Narrowly
technical reasons may lead to denials. Review
may be sought too late; the judgment of the
lower court may not be final; it may not be
the judgment of the State court of last resort;
the decision may be supportable as a matter of
State law, not subject to review by this Court,
even though the State court also passed on
issues of federal law. A decision may satisfy
all these technical requirements and yet may
commend itself for review to fewer than four
members of the Court. Pertinent considerations
of judicial policy here come into play. A case
may raise an important question but the record
may be cloudy. It may be desirable to have
different aspects of an issue further illuminated
by the lower courts. Wise adjudication has its
own time for ripening.
* * *

Inasmuch, therefore, as all that a denial of a
petition for a writ of certiorari means is that
fewer than four members of the Court thought it
should be granted, this Court has rigorously
insisted that such a denial carries with it no
implication whatever regarding the Court's views
on the merits of the case which it has declined
to review. The Court has said this again and
again; again and again the admonition has to be
repeated.
See also, United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 460-61 (1973)
(Marshall, J. dissenting).
POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT'S PATENTLY DEFECTIVE JURY
INSTRUCTIONS SHOULD BE REVIEWED.
The Crookstons contend that the trial court's defective
jury instructions should not be reviewed on appeal on several
grounds:

(1) that the instructions were not objected to by trial

counsel for Fire Insurance, (2) that the instructions were
substantially correct statements of the law, (3) that Fire
-13-

Insurance sustained no prejudice as a result of the defective
instructions, and (4) that Fire Insurance has failed to establish
any "special circumstances" which would merit review of the jury
instructions on appeal.
A.

Considerations Warranting Review of the
Defective Instructions.
Fire Insurance admits that it did not formally make any

objection at trial to the allegedly defective jury instructions.,
However, this Court's review of those jury instructions is not
confined to the limited review provided for by Rule 51, U.R.C.P.
While Rule 51 permits this Court to review jury instructions that
were not objected to at trial, Rule 59(a), U.R.C.P., also provides
this Court with ample authority to review patently defective jury
instructions:
Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new
trial may be granted to all or any of the
parties and on all or part of the issues,
for any of the following causes . . . .
(1)

irregularity in the proceedings of the
court, jury, or adverse party, or any
order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented
from having a fair trial.
* * *

(7) error in law.
The Colorado Supreme Court in First Security National
Bank v. Campbell, 198 Colo. 344, 599 P.2d 915 (1979), noted that
courts are not restricted by the limitations of Rule 51 for the
review of jury instructions not objected to at trial. In
Campbell, plaintiff bank commenced the action against defendant on

-14-

two promissory notes. Defendant answered and counterclaimed
against plaintiff.

The jury returned a verdict for defendant on

the counterclaim and against the bank on its claim.

After the

bank filed a motion for a new trial, the trial court granted a new
trial on the ground that the instructions given were erroneous and
incomplete.

The bank's trial counsel did not, however, raise any

objection at trial to the instructions, did not tender any
alternative instructions, and did not raise any issue about
defective instructions in the motion for a new trial.
Upon retrial, the trial court found for the plaintiff bank.
The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed the outcome of the second
trial, holding that the trial court had erred in granting a new
trial since the bank's counsel had failed to properly object to
the instructions.
The Colorado Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the
Court of Appeals, and affirmed the actions of the trial court, by
stating:
The ground for which a new trial may be
ordered are set forth in Rule 59(a). Such
grounds are the basis for a new trial both
upon motion of the parties or by the trial
court upon its own initiative. It may grant
a new trial on the basis of any of these
grounds without the qualification otherwise
imposed by Rule 51. Of relevance is C.R.C.P.
59(a)(1) which provides that a new trial may
be granted on the basis of "[a]ny irregularity
in the proceedings by which any party was
prevented from having a fair trial." In this
case the trial judge determined that a new
trial was required to insure that justice was
served. Whether or not a new trial is granted
is usually a matter for the sound discretion
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of the trial judge whose presence and observation of the trial better equipped him for
making this decision. Brncic v. Metz, 28
Colo.App. 204, 471 P.2d 618 (1970).
We hold that Rule 51 is a restriction upon
parties, not upon the court. A trial court
may sua sponte, in the exercise cf its sound
discretion and in order to accomplish substantial justice, order a new trial on the
basis of erroneous or improper jury instructions.
This rule is subject only to the limitations
of Rule 59(a) and is not restricted by a
party's failure to comply with the contemporaneous objection requirement of Rule 51.
Campbell, 599 P.2d at 916-17 (emphasis added).
Similar concerns moved the United States Supreme Court in
City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981), to
vacate and remand an action back to the trial court on the basis
of defective jury instructions that were not objected to at trial.
The Court in City of Newport rejected the proposition that it was
limited to any set standard of review in considering the defective
nature of jury instructions at trial:
Nor are we persuaded that our review should
be limited to determining whether "plain error"
has been committed, an exception to Rule 51 that
is invoked on occasion by the Courts of Appeals
absent timely objection in the trial court. No
"right" to a specific standard of review exists
in this setting, any more than a "right" to
review existed at all once petitioner failed to
except to the charge at trial. But given the
special circumstances of this case, limiting our
review to a restrictive "plain error" standard
would be peculiarly inapt.
Id. at 256.
The Court in City of Newport noted the alleged defective
instructions impacted important policy considerations surrounding
the awarding of punitive damages. Rather than avoid the question
-16-

on the availability of punitive damages against a municipality, due
to the city's failure to object to the suspect jury instruction,
the United States Supreme Court reviewed the defective instruction:
We undertake review here in order to resolve
one element of the uncertainty, that is, the
availability of punitive damages, and it would
scarcely be appropriate or just to confine any
review to determining whether any error that
might exist as sufficiently egregious to qualify
under Rule 51. The very novelty of the legal
issue at stake counsels unrestricted review.
In addition to being novel, the punitive damages
question is important and appears likely to
recur in Section 1983 litigation against municipalities. And here the question was squarely
presented and decided on a complete trial record
by the court of first resort, was argued by both
sides to the Court of Appeals, and has been fully
briefed before this Court. In light of all these
factors, we conclude that restricting our review
to the plain-error standard which served neither
to promote the interests of justice nor to
advance efficient judicial administration.
Id. at 257.
This Court's review, likewise, of the claimed errors in
the jury instructions should not be limited due to Fire
Insurance's failure to object to the instructions at trial. The
Rules of Procedure, both appellate and civil, are designed to promote and insure the interests of justice.

The United States

Supreme Court has stated that courts should be hesitant to
interpret rules of practice and procedure in such a way as to
diminish the likelihood of a fair and just result occurring:
Rules of practice and procedure are designed
to promote the ends of justice, not to defeat
them. A rigid and undeviating judicially
declared practice under which courts of review
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would invariably and under all circumstances
decline to consider all questions which had not
previously been specifically urged would be out
of harmony with this policy. Orderly rules of
procedure do not require sacrifice of the rules
of fundamental justice.
Hormel v. Helverinq, 312 U.S. 552, 557 (1940)
The Crookstons suggest that they should be permitted to
prevail on appeal on the technical and rigid application of Rule
51, U.R.C.P.

The Crookstons ignore the effect this case may have

on other cases and litigants.
piece of litigation.

This case is not a "garden variety"

This case involves an unprecedented award of

punitive damages in the State of Utah.
case will be felt far and wide.

The ramifications of this

Under such circumstances, this

Court should note the concerns raised by the court in Wirtz v.
International Harvester, 331 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1964).

In Wirtz,

plaintiffs brought a fair labor standards action against their
employer for alleged unpaid overtime compensation.

The jury

returned a verdict in favor of the defendant employer.

Plaintiffs

appealed, asserting that the jury instructions were in error.

The

plaintiffs did not, however, challenge the jury instructions at
trial.
In reversing and remanding the trial court's actions on
the basis of defective instructions, the Fifth Circuit noted that
the outcome of the trial had broad repercussions and established
dangerous precedent.

The court noted with concern:

This litigation is not, of course, a private
contest. It is litigation touching upon the
proper application of the Wage and Hour law
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which has a broad public purpose independent
of the rights of the particular persons who
appeared as the original plaintiffs in the
suit below. Other employees of this local
installation may have rights that are affected
by the proper determination of this case.
Id. at 465.

In view of the broad interests involved in this case,

this Court should freely review the defective jury instructions in
this case.

Fire Insurance respectfully submits that the

instructions were in error, and that the defects prejudiced Fire
Insurance's right to a fair and just trial.
B.

Instruction Nos. 28 and 29 Were Defective.
On appeal, the Crookstons urge this Court to disregard

the obvious.

The trial court's fraud instruction, Instruction

No. 28, omitted several critical and essential factors.
1509-10)

(R. at

The Crookstons attempt to explain away these defects by

claiming that the instruction was patterned after a federal jury
instruction.

Respondents' brief at 29. The substantive law of

fraud is an issue of state law, not federal common law.

The trial

court erred in not patterning instruction No. 28 after the
explicit standard set forth in Pace v. Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 247
P.2d 273, 274 (1952) .
The Crookstons likewise attempt to explain away the
deficiencies in Instruction No. 29 by claiming that the
circumstances in this case merit a finding that a fiduciary
relationship existed between Fire Insurance and the Crookstons.
While Fire Insurance admits that it had a contractual relationship
with both the Crookstons and Rocky Mountain State Bank that
relationship did not give rise to a fiduciary relationship or a
-19-

relationship of trust whereby the Crookstons had a right to
"heedlessly accept as truth" whatever Fire Insurance stated.

This

Court has clearly delineated the nature of the relationship
between an insured and its insurer.

The relationship is purely

contractual, rather than fiduciary.

Beck v. Farmers Insurance

Exchange, 701 P-2d 795, 800 (Utah 1984).

As a result, the rela-

tionship between Fire Insurance and the Crookstons was for all
intents and purposes adversarial in nature.

Lyon v. Hartford

Accident and Indemnity Co., 25 Utah 2d 311, 480 P.2d 739, 745
(1971), overruled on other grounds, 701 P.2d 798 (1985).
The consideration of the type of relationship that
existed between Fire Insurance and the Crookstons, and the
propriety of Jury Instruction No. 29, creating a rebuttable
presumption of a right to rely in behalf of the Crookstons, must
be viewed with several factors in mind.

First, it is important to

realize that Fire Insurance also had a first-party contractual
relationship with the bank.

Fire Insurance owed parallel duties

to both the Crookstons and the bank.

This unique tri-party

relationship was contractual in nature, rather than fiduciary.
Second, throughout the entire time when the allegedly fraudulent
representations were made by Fire Insurance, the Crookstons were
represented by competent counsel, H. Ralph Klemm.

Third, although

Fire Insurance had a contractual relationship with the bank, Fire
Insurance had no right or ability to control the allegedly
wrongful foreclosure on the Crookstons' home.

In addition, Fire

Insurance had no ability or right to control the bank's use of the
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settlement proceeds.

The Crookstons1 damages, if any, are not the

result of any breach of a fiduciary or "quasi fiduciary" duty, but
rather arise out of the breach of contractual duties based upon
the express and implied terms and conditions of the insurance policy issued by Fire Insurance.

There is no basis in law or fact

for holding that there was a fiduciary relationship between Fire
Insurance and the Crookstons, nor any right on the part of the
Crookstons to "heedlessly accept as truth" whatever Fire Insurance
represented to them and their counsel.
POINT IV.
THE CROOKSTONS* CLAIMS WERE BARRED UNDER THE
POLICY'S CONTRACTUAL LIMITATION PROVISION.
The Crookstons contend on appeal that the trial court
committed no error in denying Fire Insurance's motion for summary
judgment based on the policy's one-year limitation period on the
commencement of actions against Fire Insurance.

The pertinent

policy provision requires:
No suit or action on this policy for the
recovery of any claim shall be sustainable
in any court of law or equity unless all the
requirements of this policy shall have been
complied with, and unless commenced within
12 months next after inception of the loss.
(R. at 18).

Fire Insurance respectfully submits that the trial

court committed error in denying its motion for summary judgment.
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A.

The Scope of the Policy Limitation is Not
Restricted to Contract Actions.
There is strong and persuasive authority that rejects the

narrow construction given to the policy limitation by the
Crookstons.

Numerous courts have held that such policy provisions

bar all actions, including tort claims, not brought within the
limitation period contained in the policy of insurance.

In

Lawrence v. Western Mutual Insurance Co., 204 Cal.3d 565, 251
Cal.Rptr. 319 (1984), the California court held that a policy
provision, identical to that presented in this case, applied to
all claims brought against an insurer.
had a home constructed in 1968.
portion of the home settled.

In Lawrence, the plaintiff

In late 1983 or early 1984, a

Plaintiff retained an expert who

opined that the settlement was due to inadequate compaction of the
fill dirt upon which the house was built.

Plaintiff erroneously

concluded that the damages caused by the earth movement were
excluded from coverage under his policy.

Plaintiff did not file a

claim for the loss until July 15, 1985. Defendant denied
coverage.

Plaintiff then filed suit against defendant for breach

of contract, misrepresentation, and bad faith in January, 1985.
Defendant moved for summary judgment on the ground that the suit
was barred by the contractual one-year limitation on the filing of
an action.

Defendant's motion was granted.

On appeal, the plaintiff contended that his claims were
not "on the policy."

The California Court of Appeals rejected the

plaintiff's argument, and affirmed the lower court's granting of
summary judgment based upon the contractual limitation, by
-22-

stating:
Finally, the one-year commencement of suit
provision also precludes Lawrence from
recovery on the cause of action for alleged
tortious bad faith in handling his claim
because of purported misrepresentations in
the policy concerning coverage. Claims
arising out of the contractual relationship
are subject to the contractual limitations
period contained in the insurance policy.
Lawrence, 251 Cal.Rptr. at 324. See also Abari v. State Farm Fire
& Casualty Co. ,

Cal.3d

,

Cal.Rptr.

(1988).

Georgia courts have likewise held that limitation
provisions, identical to that at issue in this case, apply to all
actions and claims against insurers.

In Reece v. Massachusetts

Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 107 Ga.App. 581, 130 S.E.2d 72
(1963), the court rejected an insured's claim that his action was
not "on the policy."

In Reece, the court stated:

Plaintiff in error concedes in his brief
that because of this clause [a one-year
right to commence action provision] he
cannot maintain an action for breach of the
contract. He ingeniously attempts to
circumvent this disaster by labeling his
petition as an action ex delicto with the
expectation that through this means he will
be able to invoke the usual statutory time
limitation for bringing tort action . . . .
However, as we view it, we do not think it
at all necessary to decide whether the
petition is ex contractu or ex delicto. It
makes no difference. In either proceeding
the valid stipulation of the contract limits
the time within which the action may be
sustained to 12 months after the loss.
Reece, 130 S.E.2d at 785. See also, Modern Carpet Industries,
Inc. v. Factory Insurance Association, 125 Ga.App. 150, 186 S.E.2d
586, 587 (1971).
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The courts of Wisconsin have also rejected the narrow
construction now urged upon this Court by the Crookstons. In
Skrupky v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 55 Wise.2d 636, 201 N.W.2d
49 (1972), the court held that the contractual limitation was
applicable to the plaintiff!s claims of misrepresentation and
negligence.

Plaintiff brought suit maintaining that defendant emd

defendant's agents misrepresented the coverage under his policy
and were negligent in failing to provide full coverage. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the trial court's refusal to
grant summary judgment in favor of the defendant.

In reaching its

decision, the court stated:
[W]hen a loss occurs that is or should have
been covered by an insurance contract, an
action or suit to collect must be based upon
the policy. It is the insurance policy or
contract that creates the obligation on the
party of the insurance company to pay the
loss.
Skrupky, 201 N.W.2d at 51-2. See also, Martin v. Liberty Mutual
Fire Insurance Co., 97 Wise.2d 127, 293 N.W.2d 168 (1980).
B.

The One-Year Contractual Limitation Provision
is Enforceable.
The Crookstons maintain on appeal that the longer three-

year limitation period provided for under Utah Code Ann.
§31A-21-313 (Supp. 1986), should govern this case. The Crookstons
urge that Utah Code Ann. §31A-21-313 (Supp. 1986) should be
retroactively applied to this case since the statutory provision
is "procedural" rather than "substantive."

While such an argument

may make sense under other circumstances, a contrary result is
required in this case.
-24-

The undisputed facts in this case are that the
"inception" of the plaintiffs' losses occurred on December 2,
1981.

The governing statute at that time permitted insurers to

impose one-year limitations periods in their policies.
Ann. §31-19-19 (1953) (repealed 1986).

Utah Code

When the plaintiffs filed

suit in 1983, §31-19-19 was still in effect. All of the critical
elements surrounding the plaintiffs' claims, including the
collapse of their home, occurred prior to the enactment of Utah
Code Ann. §31A-21-313 (Supp. 1986).
This Court in State Dept. of Social Services v. Higgs,
656 P.2d 998 (Utah 1982), recognized that even "procedural"
statutes may not be applied retroactively to "enlarge, eliminate,
or destroy vested or contractual rights."

1x3. at 1000. Once the

"inception" of the plaintiffs' loss occurred in December, 1981,
the interest and rights of the parties under the policy of insurance issued by Fire Insurance vested.

Once those rights were

vested, the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §31A-21-313 (Supp. 1986)
may not be applied retroactively to impair the parties' obligations under that contract.

See U.S. Const., Art. I, §10; and Utah

Const., Art. I, §§1, 7 and 18.
C.

The Crookstons' Claims Were Not Tolled Under
Either Utah Code Ann. §71-12-40 (1953) or
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-44 (1953).
The Crookstons also contend that if the one-year policy

limitation is valid, that their claims are somehow saved under the
tolling provisions of Utah Code Ann. §§78-12-40 and 78-12-44
(1953).

The Crookstons seek to have this court apply the saving
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statute, Utah Code Ann. §78-12-40 (1953), since they first sought
redress through the Insurance Department of the State of Utah.
The Crookstons ignore that Utah Code Ann. §78-12-40 applies only
where an "action is commenced within due time. . . . "

The type of

"action" envisioned under that statute does not include the type
of proceeding initiated by the Crookstons and the Utah State
Insurance Department.

The term "action" should be construed

narrowly to include only those proceedings in courts of justice or
quasi judicial bodies in which the rights of the parties may be
conclusively adjudicated.

See Crystal Carline v. State Tax

Commission, 110 Utah 426, 174 P.2d 984 (1946).

While public

policy may favor alternative dispute resolution, i.e., contacting
the State Insurance Department with disputes, the provisions of
the saving statute, Utah Code Ann. §78-12-40 (1953), requires far
more than merely filing a letter of dispute.
The Crookstons likewise contend that the provisions of
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-44 somehow resurrect their causes of action
against Fire Insurance.

In order to accept that proposition, one

must first accept that the policy's limitation period is somehow
superceded by other statutory limitations and exceptions thereto.
There is no such concession found within the four corners of the
policy issued by Fire Insurance.

The contractual limitation

period found in the policy preempts any and all other potentially
applicable limitation periods imposed by statute.
The contractural limitations found in the subject policy
applies to and bars all of the Crookstons' claims against Fire
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Insurance.

Such contractual limitations are enforceable. The

parties' obligations and rights under the policy vested as of
December 2, 1981. No statutory amendment can impair the parties'
vested rights and obligations thereafter.

The tolling provisions

relied upon by the Crookstons are wholly inapplicable.

The trial

court committed error in denying Fire Insurance's motion for
summary judgment.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, Fire Insurance respectfully
requests that the judgment of the trial court be reversed, and
that this court direct the trial court to enter a finding that the
Crookstons' claims against Fire Insurance are barred under the
provisions of the policy's one-year right to commence action
provision.

In the alternative, Fire Insurance requests that this

matter be reversed and remanded with directions that a new trial
be granted.
Dated this

.
23

day of / JOVJUSAMM^

, 1988.

STRONG & HANNI

Frank A. Roybal
Attorneys for Fire Insurance
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I hereby certify that four true and correct copies of the
foregoing was hand delivered this Q$

day of Jl^yJ^^jM^^

1988, to the following:
L. Rich Humpherys
Christensen, Jensen & Powell, P-C.
510 Clark Learning Building
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Respondents

F6-RBll/22/88nh
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ADDENDUM

Utah Code Annot. §31-19-19 (1953) (repealed 1986)
Void conditions, stipulations or agreements,—
(1) No insurance contract delivered or issued
for delivery in this state and covering subjects
located, resident or to be performed in this
state shall contain any condition, stipulation,
or agreement
* * *

(c) limiting right of action against the
insurer to a period of less than one year from
the time when the cause of action accrues in
connection with all insurances other than property and marine and transportation insurance.
In contracts of property insurance, or of marine
and transportation insurance such limitation shall
not be to a period of less than one year from the
date of the loss.
(2) Any such condition, stipulation or agreement shall be void, but such voiding shall not
affect the validity of the other provisions of
the contract.
Utah Code Annot. 31A-21-313 (Supp. 1986)
Limitation of actions,
(1) An action on a written policy or contract of insurance must be commenced within
three years after the inception of the loss.
* * *

(3) No insurance policy may:
(a) Limit the time for beginning an
action on the policy to a time less than
that authorized by statute;

A-l

Utah Code Annot. §78-12-40 (1953)
Effect of failure of action not on merits.
If any action is commenced within due time
and a judgment thereon for the plaintiff is
reversed, or if the plaintiff fails in such
action or upon a cause of action otherwise than
upon the merits, and the time limited either by
law or contract for commencing the same shall
have expired, the plaintiff, or if he dies and
the cause of action survives, his representatives,
may commence a new action within one year after
the reversal or failure.
Utah Code Annot. §78-12-44 (1953)
Effect of payment, acknowledgment, or promise
to pay.
In any case founded on contract, when any
part of the principal or interest shall have
been paid, or an acknowledgment of an existing
liability, debt or claim, or any promise to
pay the same, shall have been made, an action
may be brought within the period prescribed
for the same after such payment, acknowledgment
or promise; but such acknowledgment or promise
must be in writing, signed by the party to be
charged thereby. When a right of action is
barred by the provisions of any statute, it
shall be unavailable either as a cause of
action or ground of defense.

A-2

A RELATIVE SAMPLING OF UTAH PUNITIVE DAMAGE CASES
Date

Case

Punitive
Award

1987

Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange

$ 4,000,000

1987

Roberts v. Seven-Up, C-86-0013 Third
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County

300,0001

1985

Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766 (Utah 1985)

500,000

1985

Synergetics v. Marathon Ranching, 701 P.2d
1106 (Utah 1985)

200,000

1985
1984

Atkin, Wright & Miles v. Mountain States
Telephone, 709 P.2d 330 (Utah 1985)

30,000

Bundy v. Century Equipment, 692 P.2d 754
(Utah 1984)

75,000

1983

Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983)

28,000

1983

Cruz v. Montoya, 660 P.2d 723 (Utah 1983)

12,000

1982

First Security Bank v. JBJ Feedyards, 653
P.2d 591 (Utah 1982)
Leigh Furniture v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293 (Utah
1982)
Branch v. Western Petroleum, 657 P.2d 267

1982
1982

100,000
35,000

(Utah 1982)

13,000

1980

Elkington v. Foust, 618 P.2d 37 (Utah 1980)

30,000

1979

Terry v. Zions Cooperative Merchantile
Institution, 605 P.2d 1314 (Utah 1979)

15,000

1975

Kesler v. Rogers, 542 P.2d 354 (Utah 1975)

10,000

1975

Prince v. Peterson, 538 P.2d 1325 (Utah
1975)
Holdaway v. Hall, 29 Utah 2d 77, 505 P.2d
295 (1973)

1973

ijury awarded $10,000,000.
by trial court.

3,000
10,000

Punitive award remitted to $300,000
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Geoffrey J. Butler
Clerk of the Supreme Court
332 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84114
Re:

MAR 5 1991

Crookston v. Fire Insurance Exchange, Clerk, Supreme Court, Utah
Case No. 880034

Dear Mr. B u t l e r :

Pursuant to Rule 24(j), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
the Crookstons, respondents in the above-captioned matter, hereby
submit the following supplemental citation:
Reference in
Brief
Point III,
p. 46
Point IV C
p. 65

Citation

Subject

Pacific Mutual Life Insurance
Company v. Haslip, No. 89-1279,
(Decided March 4, 1991)

Fourteenth Amendment
to United States
Constitution does
not preclude award
of punitive damages
in amount more than
four times the amount
awarded as compensatory damages.

———

U • o • _____________ , _____________

—* • —* t •

L.Ed. 2d
1991 WL 24587

Thank you for your attention to this matter.
Sincerely,
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN Jc POWELL, P.C.

M. Douglas Bayly
MDB:cl
cc:

Philip R. Fishier
Steven J. Trayner
Frank A. Roybal

